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ABSTRACT 
The SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research) program provides a way to assist 
entrepreneurs in commercializing their technology, and it provides government access to new 
technology. There are many issues facing technology start-ups. Some of the issues and 
possible responses are discussed. Kinetic Art & Technology (KAT) is an SBIR success story. 
With almost four million dollars in federal grant funds, the company developed and is 
commercializing new electric motor technology. The issues they faced and the decisions they 
made are key components o_f their success. 
INTRODUCTION 
Stre;uns of new technolo1,,'Y ;m:· unveiled each 
year. However, only a small percenta11;e of 
these prom1s111g technologies reach 
commercialization. True, not every invention 
is worth the cost im'olved in bringing a 
product to market. Even for those tech-
nologies which offer society great promise, the 
path to commercialization is long, difficult, 
and costly. This paper discusses the 
challenges a technology start-up faces, and 
wavs the entrepreneur can meet them. A 
111<\ior source of help is tl1e Small Business 
Investment Research (SBIR) program, 
launched as a ten-agenn', applied research 
experiment bv the Small Business lnnm,ation 
Den·lopment Act of l ~182 (Brmrn & Turner, 
I 9~J9). 
Recent articles demonstrate the difficulties 
start-ups have faced with developing tech-
nology. Baron and Hannan CW02) suggested 
that personnel issues and hrnY an organiza-
71 
tion designs its human resources are key 
elements of success. Stewart and Giagtzis 
(200 l) suggested iliat the entrepreneur cannot 
just put a product on tl1e market. but must 
know the needs and requirements of their 
potential customers. Piper (2002) asserted 
that ?\ASA's attempts at commercialization of 
technology result in putting technology "out 
iliere" with anticipation that the market will 
come to the pnnider of the technology, but 
their programs ha\'C had little success. 
Achibald and Finifter (2003) found focusing 
011 pn~jects with more commercial potential 
led to higher rates of commercial success. 
SBIR PROGRAM 
The federal government recognized that 
useful technology was resident within small 
businesses, but saw no way to access it 
systematically for government use. In 1982, 
Congress created the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) grant program 
to address that problem. Currently, ten 
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federal agencies (Departments of Agricul-
ture, Education, Transportation, Commerce, 
Energy, Defense, Health and Human 
Services/National Institute of Health, 
Environmental Protection Agency, National 
Science Foundation, and National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration) par-
ticipate in the program and each spends 2.5 
percent of their agency budget on the SBIR 
program. The goal of the SBIR program is 
commercialization of new technologies, 
which can be used by both the public and 
private sectors. 
Each of the participating agencies publishes 
electronic solicitations seeking grant 
proposals from small businesses on specific, 
or in some cases general, topics. Usually the 
topics are problems the agency is unable to 
solve internally. The SBIR program has three 
phases. In Phase I, agencies offer up to 
$100,000 for six months for the company to 
develop proof of concept. In Phase II, the 
agencies offer up to $750,000 to assist the 
company in developing a prototype. To be 
eligible for Phase II funding, a company 
must have successfully completed a Phase I 
project. Phase Ill is the commercialization 
segment, in which no grant funds flow from 
the federal government. Frequently, the 
agency that funds Phase I and Phase II 
becomes the customer of the small business 
that has developed the technology. 
Additionally, companies are encouraged to 
seek private sector customers. The dual use 
of technologies is a key feature of the SBIR 
program. Persistence, following the 
solicitation guidelines to the letter, and 
knowing the agency and what they 
need/want are keys to entry in all phases of 
the program. 
There has been little large-scale evaluation of 
the economic success of the program. Brown 
and Turner ( 1999) argued that the successes 
have been at the expense of other 
government research support for small 
business. Lerner (2000) reported on a large-
scale study comparing the employment and 
growth of 1435 SBIR firms with matching 
firms over a ten-year period. He stated, 
"SBIR awardees enjoyed substantially 
greater employment and sales growth than 
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the matching firms." (Lerner, 2000 p. 977). 
The awardees had a mean sales increase of 
$4.0 million and the matching firms of$ I.I 
million (98% increase for awardees and 27% 
for matching firms). Lerner suggested that 
the awards play a certification function for 
the awardees. Both Brown and Turner (1999) 
and Lerner (2000) call for changes in the 
program to make it more focused on 
commercialization of technology. Cooper 
(2003) discussed the commercialization 
obstacles faced by SBIR firms. Others have 
suggested that the successes of the program 
show its continued value (Science, 51512000). 
Mervis ( 1992) reported that the Defense 
Department ignores the intent of the program 
by insisting that most of its awards be used 
to make things that the military can use. 
However, the program is designed to provide 
improved technology for government use as 
well as for commercial use. Nelton ( 1998) 
reported that some agencies, such as Defense 
and Energy, do make use of the technologies 
developed, while agencies such as Education 
and Agriculture do not tend to be end users. 
ISSUES FACING STARTUPS 
Wu and Young (2001 ), in a study of small 
firms over the period 1973-97, found 
financing problems increasing over the time 
period; marketing and human resource 
problems persistent over time; and liquidity, 
record keeping, accounting, and inventory 
problems decreasing over the period of 
study. Stewart and Giagtzis (200 I) 
suggested, " ... that new technology is not 
enough to ensure success, and other issues 
must be attended to. These include product 
positioning, engineering utilization, and 
management competence"(P.120). The given 
is engineering competence and the product, 
but they do not lead to success of a venture. 
Gans and Stern (2003) found that "SBIR 
project perfonnance is highest for those 
projects in industrial segments which, 
themselves, receive the highest level of 
venture funding'' (p.382). This indicates that 
funding of technology by government 
agencies in sectors most interesting to 
venture capital promises the highest levels of 
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commercial success of ventures. Conversely, 
this suggests that technology in these sectors 
has the highest chance of developing with 
private capital and that the government 
should focus its funding efforts in 
technology sectors with less venture capital 
interest. Nicolaou and Birley (2003) studied 
university technology spinouts. They 
examined "the interaction between non-
redundancy and tie strength" (p.1718), the 
interaction of the social networks of 
entrepreneurs. Nonredundancy m social 
contacts, or lack of crossover among the 
principals, improves success of spinouts. 
Also, the strength of the ties to the network 
improves success. They called for 
"universities to organize networking events 
showcasing the technology generated at 
universities" (p.1719). Technology transfer 
offices should provide a brokering role 
between entrepreneurs, external investors, 
and inventors. Kinetic Art and Technology 
(KAT) benefited from Indiana University's 
setting up contacts both to advise the 
inventor/entrepreneur at various stages of the 
venture and to assist in locating opportunities 
for the product. 
Spencer, Murtha, and Lenway (2005) argued 
for a framework depicting "technological 
innovation as an evolutionary process of 
variation, selection, and retention character-
ized by incremental advances punctuated by 
occasional discontinuous changes. 
industry evolution as a process that involves 
the co-development of technology and 
institutions via repeated interactions among a 
range of industry participants. As 
industries develop from initial breakthrough 
to commercialization and large scale 
manufacturing, the level of uncertainty 
inherent in the innovation process 
diminishes" (p.321-2). This view supports 
Nicolaou and Birley (2003), as discussed 
above. KA Ts success appears to support this 
framework as well. 
Models of new venture creation have been 
proposed by several authors. A problem with 
most is that they highlight only one aspect of 
formation. Kaulio (2003) suggested a model 
looking at the process of the transition stage 
between initial conditions and the initial 
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process of evolution. The model is based on 
a critical incident study of Swedish startups. 
The most critical incidents are financing the 
venture and then recruiting. Two 
observations about recruiting are: (I) the 
entrepreneur's personal network is relied on 
to a large extent, thus supporting studies of 
the importance of networks to infant 
ventures; and (2) recruiting has a strategic, as 
well as a marketing, related dimension. 
Attracting the right people to the startup 
appears to signal the market that the strategy 
is set, thus indicating the organization is 
stable and viable. Two other critical 
incidents are the signing of the reference or 
first customers to contracts, indicating the 
venture is 'real', and the utilization of 
entrepreneurial service providers. The use of 
public, not for profit, and private sources of 
assistance supports the call for developing 
networks of service providers to assist 
startups to succeed. 
Technology business models emphasize 
cooperative strategies and highly flexible 
relationship-based structures capable of 
responding to rapid and sometimes radical 
changes in the marketplace and technology 
(Kelly, Schaan, & Joncas, 2002). 
Collaborative success is elusive (See Kelly, 
et al, 2002, for list of studies). A study of 
alliances finds issues centered on 
people/relationship issues, operations issues, 
strategic agenda issues, and results or 
problems related to the performance of the 
venture (Kelly, Schaan, & Joncas, 2002). 
Their study suggests eight items that need 
careful consideration in developing the 
relationships necessary to create successful 
startup alliances. The key points are: ( l) 
partner selection -- not only hard facts but 
also soft issues such as potential 
compatibility; (2) negotiation, a win-win 
process of building linkages between the 
companies; (3) people selection, (4) learning 
and relationship building; (5) communication 
building; (6) reconciliation of cultural differ-
ences; (7) ongoing relationship management; 
and (8) constructive interaction. 
Several studies, already discussed, highlight 
the people issues that are critical to startup 
success, especially a technology startup. The 
need for an excellent management team and 
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a board of directors with skills that 
supplement the management team are critical 
components of success (McCaffrey, 2003; 
Preston, 2003). The use of outside advisors 
often spells the difference between success 
and failure of startups (Leonard & Swap, 
2000). KAT's recruitment of engineers, 
technicians, and,ultimately, of a new 
venture-experienced marketing executive to 
supervise commercialization of their tech-
nology was a key component of their 
success. Their use of the resources of Indiana 
University and other advisors is also critical 
in moving their technology to the 
marketplace. 
KAT's Story 
Much has been written on the success and 
failure of high tech start-ups. Much of it is 
mirrored in the challenges Kinetic Art & 
Technology (KA D has faced. LaPlante 
( 1997) wrote in Computerworld the "formula 
for success: equal parts pain, vision, money, 
luck, and timing"(P.S2). KAT's story shows 
that it is important to meet the needs of the 
customer; without a customer in "pain," 
there is no market. The initial idea was for a 
miniature electric motor to drive animation 
cameras, but KAT learned that SBIR funds 
were likely to be for larger applications. 
They sold the idea to the Department of 
Defense's Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) and provided a 
proposal that could meet their needs for 
shipboard motors for precise movement of 
large loads (Nelton, 1998). The entrepreneur 
is a most intriguing engineer, in that from the 
beginning he had a "vision" for what he 
wanted to accomplish, and he kept the vision 
at the forefront of his efforts. His business 
card indicates he is president and "keeper of 
the vision". The specifics have changed, but 
not the vision. "Money" came from meeting 
customers' needs for new technology, selling 
them on KAT's ability to accomplish the 
task, and winning grants to fund the 
development of motors (Berry, Hill, and 
Klompmaker, 1999). KAT was "lucky" 
enough to be in "the right place at the right 
time" to gain the support to move forward 
time after time. 
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The entrepreneur has a Masters of 
Engineering (Computer Science) degree, did 
an internship with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and worked for a large aerospace 
company in Colorado. He had a dream of 
making a video camera move under 
computer control, but he needed the time and 
environment in which he could develop his 
ideas. He left his job in 1990, moved to 
Greenville, Indiana where his family could 
live rent free in a house his parents fixed up 
for them. The family had an abrupt change in 
lifestyle, but they were all committed to his 
making improved motor technology a reality. 
He withdrew his funds from his retirement 
plan, the couple used their savings, and they 
pressed their credit card balances to the limit 
to support the family and his work. In this 
way Kinetic Arts Technology (KAD (a.k.a. 
Visual Computing Systems) was founded. 
(http://www.katech.com/) 
Navigating the SBIR Process 
As funds were dwindling, a fellow church 
member of the entrepreneur read about an 
SBlR seminar at Indiana University 
Southeast, and sent him the $ l 0 registration 
fee. Afterwards, he approached the 
presenters, saying he wanted to participate in 
the program. His Indiana University SBIR 
counselor encouraged him to write a 
proposal, and he responded to a Navy 
solicitation. The proposal was rejected. He 
was dejected, but felt his scientific ideas 
were well founded. At the encouragement of 
his family and people familiar with the SBIR 
program, he attended one of the three 
national SBIR conferences held each year. 
Attending the conference provided two 
benefits: (I) he learned more about the 
SBIR program, and (2) he was able to meet 
with agency people and present an 
abbreviated form of his ideas. The 
entrepreneur demonstrated the advice of the 
Small Business Administration to "be 
persistent" (Nelton, 1998). 
At the conference, government agency after 
government agency indicated lack of interest 
in the entrepreneur's ideas. Finally, he 
unleashed his well-planned phrases on the 
person from the Department of Defense's 
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Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), who listened attentively. 
Afterwards he was disappointed that the 
person had taken no notes. When the 
DARPA solicitation was released a few 
months later, the entrepreneur was elated to 
discover that one solicitation was in his area 
of interest; it had the same wording he had 
used when chatting with the DARPA 
representative at the national SBIR 
conference. The entrepreneur wrote a 
proposal to develop general-purpose motion 
modules and was awarded a Phase I for a bit 
less than the then the limit of $50,000. 
Again, the entrepreneur was an example of 
following the instructions when preparing 
the proposal and being responsive to an 
agency's solicitation (Nelton, 1998). The 
entrepreneur actually was persistent enough 
to have an agency solicit what he was 
interested in pursuing. 
The grant provided the entrepreneur with 
funding to continue his research, but it also 
provided new challenges. The first was the 
Government Accounting System. The 
entrepreneur adroitly accepted the challenge, 
and with the help of Peachtree software, 
learned a new skill set. Another challenge 
and luxury was being able to hire more 
engineering talent and pay them. The 
entrepreneur then had the challenge of 
becoming an effective manager (Baron and 
Hannan, 2002). 
Between the conclusion of the six-month 
DARPA SBIR Phase I and announcement of 
Phase II selection was a potentially 
devastating eight-month gap. The team of 
twelve stayed with the company during the 
lean times, choosing to work for stock in the 
company rather than leaving. The 
entrepreneur applied for and received Bridge 
Funding from Indiana's Business 
Modernization and Technology program, 
which provided a loan to be repaid as a 
percentage of non-research and development 
sales. 
In the course of time, the company was 
awarded a DARPA SBIR Phase II for 
$350,000 for a year and a half. Based on the 
results they submitted, the company was 
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awarded six months "follow-on" funding of 
$275,000, which came from DARPA SBIR 
funds and another pool of DARPA money. 
The company used the funding to design a 
new motor. 
The entrepreneur's interests and strengths are 
in research and development. At the 
suggestion of their attorney, KAT formed a 
subsidiary company to do product 
development and commercialization. From 
the beginning, the entrepreneur was able to 
listen to advice from others, develop new 
skill sets, and hire and utilize excellent 
professionals. With the formation of Lynx 
Motion Technology, KAT hired, as 
president, someone with expertise in 
marketing new technology to industry, a skill 
set that did not exist in the firm. The sister 
company, Lynx Motion Technology, built 
the prototype of the new motor and is 
commercializing the product. 
Lynx Motion Technology is an investor-
funded company created to build, test, and 
license technology developed by KAT. The 
entrepreneur was presented with another 
challenge: raising funding for Lynx. Again 
working outside of his comfort zone, he 
made presentations to venture capital groups. 
His efforts were successful not only in 
attracting funding, but in attracting 
marketing and management talent. Also, 
some local community people were very 
proud of him and having a high tech 
company in the community, and they 
invested in the company. This is an example 
of commercializing the technology and the 
ability to further the technology through 
outside financing, a key success factor of the 
SBIR program (Brown and Turner, 1999; 
Lerner, 2000). 
During the lean months awaiting Bridge 
Funding, the entrepreneur once again 
scoured the pages of SBIR solicitations. 
Indiana University's Industrial Research 
Liaison program helped by creating a search 
profile of his interests and expertise and 
running it against the agency solicitations as 
they were released. The entrepreneur 
responded to a Department of Energy (DOE) 
SBIR "Green Car" solicitation on hybrid 
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electric vehicles. He was awarded the SBIR 
Phase I for $75,000, but later his Phase II 
proposal was rejected. He had developed a 
good working relationship with a person in 
DOE during the Phase I, who became a 
champion of the technology in which the 
entrepreneur's company excelled. 
The entrepreneur applied for a Phase I DOE 
STTR (Small Business Technology 
Transfer), a sister program of SBIR, which 
requires a percentage of involvement by a 
university or federal research laboratory, and 
was awarded $75,000 to design flywheel 
motor alternators. During the time the 
entrepreneur was working on this project, 
DOE's interest moved away from flywheels 
and toward hybrid motors. The entrepreneur 
applied for a Phase II and received an award 
of $500,000 to develop high-speed 
Segmented Electro Magnetic Array (SEMA) 
motors. 
KAT additionally completed a DOE SBIR 
Phase I ($100,000) and Phase II ($750,000), 
developing traction motors for hybrid 
electric vehicles. Beyond that they have 
completed two DOE SBIR Phase I's 
($100,000 each) dealing with different 
aspects of integrated motion module motors 
and controls. Neither of the Phase II 
proposals was funded. The company also 
completed an Air Force SBIR Phase I 
($100,000), designing flight control 
actuators. Again the Phase II proposal was 
not funded. 
The company also submitted proposals and 
received funding from another DOE research 
and development program, CARAT, that is 
similar to the SBIR and STTR programs. 
KAT received Phase I ($150,000) and Phase 
11 ($500,000) funding to work on integrated 
motors and controls for hybrid motor 
applications. 
In 2000, the entrepreneur was awarded the 
coveted Small Business Administration 
Roland Tibbitts Award for exemplary 
achievement in the SBIR program. At that 
point the company had been awarded more 
than $4 million from four federal agencies 
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and had begun commercializing the 
technology. 
CONCLUSION 
Examining a start-up high tech company 
pulls into focus both the company's internal 
and external needs. A person may be 
technically gifted, but unless the 
entrepreneur is able to develop or otherwise 
acquire other skills, an idea may never get 
beyond the conceptualization stage. An 
entrepreneur needs to be able to organize and 
manage a business and be willing to take a 
risk. Writing grant proposals, administering 
grant funding, and managing a project are 
skills that need to be honed. Later, the head 
of the company needs to capitalize upon the 
technical strengths of the group, identify 
critical weaknesses, and in some cases hire 
to overcome the weaknesses. Putting 
together compensation packages that elicit 
the best from each worker presents a 
challenge. Effective public speaking is 
imperative for one who is seeking investors. 
The entrepreneur/inventor continuously 
needs to learn or otherwise acquire new 
skills. Another key feature is spousal, 
extended family, and community support, 
which is critical to the success of the project. 
"Partnerships help bring innovations to the 
point where private actors can bring them to 
the market. Accelerated progress in bringing 
the benefits of new products, new processes, 
and new knowledge to the market has 
positive consequences for economic growth 
and human welfare." (Wessner, 2002 p. 23). 
By understanding the perils faced by an 
entrepreneur, governments may create 
programs to minimize their failures and 
increase their successes. 
The SBIR program was instrumental in the 
development and commercialization of 
KAI's technology. While changes may be 
necessary as the economy changes (Brown & 
Turner, 1999; Lerner, 2000), the program 
works in its current form and provides new 
technology to government agencies and to 
the commercial sector. 
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